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Abstract
Rape is a weapon of  war. Establishing this now common claim has been an achievement of 
feminist scholarship and activism and reveals wartime sexual violence as a social act marked 
by gendered power. But the consensus that rape is a weapon of  war obscures important, and 
frequently unacknowledged, differences in ways of  understanding and explaining it. This 
article  opens  these  differences  to  analysis.  Drawing  on  recent  debates  regarding  the 
philosophy  of  social  science  in  IR  and  social  theory,  it  interprets  feminist  accounts  of  
wartime sexual violence in terms of  modes of  critical explanation – expansive styles of  reasoning 
that  foreground particular  actors,  mechanisms,  reasons and stories in the formulation of  
research. The idea of  a mode of  critical explanation is expanded upon through a discussion 
of  the role of  three elements (analytical wagers, narrative scripts and normative orientations)  
which accomplish the theoretical work of  modes. Substantive feminist accounts of  wartime 
sexual  violence  are  then  differentiated  in  terms  of  three  modes  –  of  instrumentality,  
unreason and mythology – which implicitly structure different understandings of  how rape 
might be a weapon of  war. These modes shape political and ethical projects and so impact 
not only on questions of  scholarly content but also on the ways in which we attempt to 
mitigate and abolish war rape. Thinking in terms of  feminist modes of  critical explanation 
consequently encourages further work in an unfolding research agenda. It clarifes the ways 
in  which an apparently  commonality  of  position can conceal  meaningful  disagreements 
about  human  action.  Exposing  these  disagreements  opens  up  new  possibilities  for  the 
analysis of  war rape. 
Keywords
Wartime sexual violence, rape, war, feminism, explanation, social theory, philosophy of 
social science
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I'm sure you have reasons
A rational defence
Weapons and motives
Bloody fngerprints
But I can't help thinking
It's still all disease.
Fugazi, 'Argument' (2001)
'Weapon of  War' could be many explanations and I'm not sure of  any of  them.
UNHCR offcial, Goma, Democratic Republic of  Congo, June 2010i
Introduction: 'Lootpillageandrape'ii
Rape is  a weapon of  war.  Such is  the refrain of  practically  all  contemporary academic  
research,  political  advocacy  and  media  reporting  on  wartime  sexual  violence.  Once 
considered frmly outside the remit of  foreign policy, rape is today labelled as a ‘tactic of  
war’  by  US  Secretaries  of  State  who  pledge  to  eradicate  it  (Clinton,  2009)  and 
acknowledged  as  a  war  crime  and  constituent  act  of  genocide  at  the  highest  levels  of  
international law and global governance, a development which for some amounts to the 
‘international  criminalization  of  rape’  (Engle,  2005:784;  see  also  Bergoffen,  2009;  Buss, 
2009). Discussions of  wartime sexual violence thus increasingly infect high politics itself,  
leading in recent years to attention from the UN Security Council, which condemned sexual 
violence as 'widespread and systematic' and ‘a tactic of  war’ (United Nations, 2008).
But  the  consensus  that  rape  is  a  weapon  of  war  obscures  important,  and  frequently 
unacknowledged, differences in our ways of  understanding and explaining it. This article 
argues that attention to the substantive accounts of  wartime sexual violence provided by 
feminist scholarship in International Relations (IR) reveals these differences. Although there 
are  many  ways  to  interpret  the  production  of  academic  and  political  knowledge,  the 
approach adopted here analyses feminist accounts of  rape as a weapon of  war in terms of 
three different  modes of  critical  explanation  – of  instrumentality,  unreason and mythology – 
which  implicitly  structure  them  and  which  provide  the  constitutive  grammar  for  their 
diagnoses.  Modes  shape  explanatory  content  by  setting  the  objects  and  parameters  of 
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analysis and by connecting analysis to ethics and politics. Although not simply exclusive or 
exhaustive (an important caveat), they are distinct and coherent ways of  approaching the 
social  world.  As forms of  reasoning they generate contrasting and sometimes competing 
ways of  telling stories about wartime sexual violence and of  framing the ethical and political  
projects intended to abolish it. 
These different modes are exposed to critical scrutiny through several layers of  argument.  
First, in terms of  existent work on feminist theory and its treatment of  wartime sexual violence , I argue 
that  current  subdivisions  of  feminist  scholarship  in  terms  of  epistemology,  ontology  or 
methodology capture only some pertinent dynamics, allowing for an alternative framework 
of  analysis. 
Second,  engaging  with  debates  in  the  philosophy  of  social  science,  I  assess  the  place  of 
explanation in non- and post-positivist theory and suggest that diverse feminist claims about 
the use  of  rape in war can be analysed in terms of  their  different  forms of  reasoning. 
Despite the widespread framing of  feminist IR as opposed to explanatory or causal analysis, 
accounts of  wartime sexual violence can indeed be read as modes of  critical explanation, 
accounts  constructed  through  the  linking  of  analytical  wagers,  narrative  scripts  and 
normative orientations. 
Third, at a more fne-grained level, I explicate the three substantive modes of  instrumentality, unreason  
and mythology themselves and show how they structure assumptions and claims about the causes 
and character of  wartime sexual violence. Drawing on a wide range of  established analysis, 
I set out the constraints, connections and articulations of  these modes in terms of  how they 
use  wagers,  scripts  and orientations  to  tell  particular  social  scientifc  stories  (Tilly,  2006) 
about the subjects and objects of  rape in war. 
Fourth and fnally, I consider how the different modes matter, both to the politics of  ending sexual 
violence and to the politics and sociology of  knowledge itself. Together, these layers amount 
to an argument that there are important differences of  analysis, politics and ethics in what is 
· 3·
meant by 'weapon of  war', ambiguities best uncovered by a closer reading of  the differences 
within feminist IR scholarship than is possible via more commonly-cited distinctions.
These sedimented layers exist in a productive tension between inquiring into our ways of 
narrating wartime sexual violence and the events we are trying to narrate themselves. For 
some this may amount to an excessively introverted research problem. For others, it will 
suggest an unsustainable epistemological and ontological separation of  realms.  Although I 
make no attempt to resolve the meta-theoretical character of  these disputes, the substance of  
this account is intended to clarify some of  those diffculties as they relate to the analysis of 
wartime  sexual  violence.  Talk  of  stories,  grammars,  wagers,  narratives  and  normative 
orientations may also cause readers some concern. This terminology should not be taken to 
mean  that  the  accounts  analysed  are  fictions.  Instead,  it  expresses  a  view  of  them  as 
necessarily assembled and produced from the matter of  existing discourse, social scientifc 
tradition, ethico-political debates and experiences in ‘the feld’ and elsewhere. 
In short, my argument is both about feminist accounts of  wartime sexual violence and also a 
contribution  to  them.  Although  there  are  non-feminist  ways  of  studying  wartime  sexual 
violence and gender, the scholarship explored in what follows remains within the political,  
affective and analytical lineages and networks of  feminism. iii This is a feminist story because 
it politicises sexual violence as an act related to social power; because it takes as an analytical  
baseline  the  embeddedness  of  gender  practices  within  a  historically-located  hierarchical 
system of  differentiation which privileges those defned as masculine at the expense of  those 
defned  as  feminine;  and  because  it  connects  analysis  with  politics  and  ethics  at  a 
fundamental level (see Zalewski, 1995; Tickner, 1997; and Hutchings, 2000).iv 
War Rape in the Feminist Imaginary
The Politicisation of  Wartime Sexual Violence
The idea of  rape as a weapon of  war has a distinctly feminist heritage. Opposed to the  
historical placement of  gendered violence within the hidden realm of  the private, feminist 
scholarship was the frst to draw out the connections between sexual violence and the history 
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of  war, just as feminists fought to make rape in times of  nominal peace a matter for public  
concern  (Brownmiller,  1975;  Bourke,  2007).  The  prevalence  of  'weapon  of  war' 
understandings of  sexual violence owes much to this legacy, and the phrase itself  crystallises  
the feminist claim that rape is a political form of  aggression, what Eisenstein calls “a form of 
war in yet another inhumane form; an integral form of  war rather than an effect” (2007:28, 
emphasis added). Feminist academics have, then,  pioneered a view of  sexual violence as a 
form  of  social  power  characterised  by  the  operations  and  dynamics  of  gender.  Sexual 
violence  under  feminist  inquiry  is  thus  politicised,  and  forced  into  the  public  sphere 
(Harrington, 2010; Elshtain, 1995; Enloe, 1996; Owens, 2008).
This work of  politicisation has gone hand-in-hand with an awareness of  differences within 
feminism and of  the multiple theoretical perspectives that could be brought to bear on war 
rape. Most prominently, Inger Skjelsbæk (2001) has argued that feminist accounts can be 
divided into three epistemologies depending on who they conceptualise as the victims of  
wartime sexual violence: essentialists (who see all women as victims through a focus on the 
militarised expression of  underlying masculinity); structuralists (who see only some women 
as under threat and work from a group-based perspective); and social constructionists (who 
allow that both men and women may be victims and understand femininity and masculinity 
as malleable categories that could conceivably be applied to anyone within confict contexts) 
(see the similar analysis provide by Leatherman 2011:11-20).
Others have differentiated feminist accounts in terms of  their empirical and political claims. 
For example, Karen Engle (2005) has identifed two feminist camps of  analysis in relation to 
the Bosnian mass rapes, one identifying sexual violence as specifcally genocidal and another 
seeing it as of  a piece with ‘everyday’ rape in war. More recently, Donna Pankhurst has set 
out a preliminary typology exploring multiple hypotheses in feminist IR. Her fve options 
outline rape as either a weapon of  war; a reward for troops; the result of  a breakdown in 
social  constraints;  the consequence of  a 'root cause'  of  masculinity;  or the expression of 
frustration-aggression and male trauma (Pankhurst, 2010:152-156). 
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Despite providing a number of  useful distinctions, these schemata of  feminist analysis have 
been introductory or have reproduced familiar stories about the historical differentiation of  
waves of  feminists (on which see Hemmings, 2005). Where apparently signifcant disparities 
between  different  feminist  accounts  have  been  identifed,  they  have  remained  under-
elaborated.  Most  crucially,  it  has  not  been  obvious  at  which  level  the  confict  between 
alternative theoretical  accounts lies.  Skjelsbæk's  analysis  of  texts  brings out a number of 
pertinent distinctions, but traces them to putatively epistemological differences when they could 
just as well be explained by variation at a more mundane level of  theory construction. For 
example, the apparent dispute between an account of  wartime sexual violence in which all 
women are targeted and one in which men and women are targeted may tell us much more 
about  contingent  historical  factors (different wars and differing contexts may display different 
patterns of  rape) or  analytical  distinctions (between acts that are essential to a strategy and 
those that are peripheral to it) than they do about the philosophical foundations of  research. 
Moreover,  an account  which attributes  rape to the  ideas  of  gender  and nation held by 
perpetrators is not synonymous with the epistemological claim that our access to knowledge 
about the world is 'socially constructed'  (Jackson, 2010:204-207).  Similarly,  if  the tension 
between identifying the Bosnian rape camps as genocidal or as part of  a continuum with 
'peacetime' violence was primarily due to disagreements about how best to agitate for the 
political visibility of  rape, then there may be no analytical or explanatory questions at stake at 
all.  
Despite a general  concern with multiple feminisms, then, in the case of  wartime sexual 
violence it has generally seemed more important to distinguish feminist from non-feminist 
analysis  and to make the case  for war rape as  a legitimate  topic for  the attention of  IR 
scholars (Enloe, 2000; Hansen, 2001) than it has been to open up the varieties of  feminist  
analyses to scrutiny. Consequently, the rhetorical placement of  feminist accounts has often 
been in opposition to other theoretical tendencies in IR (whether realist, statist or merely  
mainstream/malestream)  rather  than  in  terms  of  which feminist  account  best  explicates 
sexualised brutality. These theoretical moves are not evidence of  faulty reasoning. Instead, 
they  refect  the history  and politics  of  the  discipline  over  the  last  decades,  replete  with 
manoeuvres of  co-option, marginalisation and misunderstanding (Hutchings, 2008; Hooper, 
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1999; Tickner, 1997). The point is not that epistemological disputes among feminists are 
irrelevant, only they are not the sole lens through which to examine feminist accounts. There 
are other aspects of  social inquiry which are in many ways more salient, and it is they which 
are obscured in the restaging of  a contest between successive waves of  feminist theory or  
between a monolithic feminism and the IR mainstream. 
Renegade Knowledgev: Feminist Theory as Critical Explanation   
The substance of  feminist accounts of  war rape reveal the ways in which theoretical claims 
are linked to empirical examples and made coherent as general explanations.vi ‘Explanation’ 
itself  has  become  a  problematic  term  in  IR  (as  well  as  outside  it)  and  is  consistently 
associated with a particular (and particularly reductive) way of  doing social science. In the 
hands of  Hollis and Smith (1990), explanation is that kind of  social science story which looks 
in from outside and attempts to unify phenomena under some regularity, usually lawlike.  
Despite  their  caution  that  this  is  only  ever  half  the  story,  explanation  is  still  generally  
advocated or opposed in terms of  a specifc variant embodied by positivism, neo-positivism 
and mathematically-enthralled programmes of  overt hyper-rationalism (see Jackson, 2010: 
63-69 and Humphreys, 2011 for enlightening discussions).
This disciplinary association of  explanation per se with some kind of  positivism (or what is 
typically understood as  positivism) is  less  and less  sustainable in the face of  increasingly 
sophisticated  critiques.  Most  crucially,  to  the  extent  that  explanation  is  considered 
synonymous  with  causal  analysis,  there  are  many possible  ways  of  invoking explanation 
without simultaneously establishing criteria of  observability, determinism, necessity or strict 
regularity (Kurki, 2008). Self-consciously refexivist and postpositivist scholars  do  engage in 
causal explanation, but evince an 'inadvertent Humeanism' when they assume that all causal 
accounts require covering laws and empirical regularities in the positivist vein, while they 
continue to engage in implicitly causal analysis when outlining constitutive forces, beliefs or 
structures as important to understanding social life (Kurki, 2008:138; see also Vucetic, 2011; 
Suganami, 2008; Suganami, 2011). 
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Methodological choices are also now less associated with defnitive philosophical approaches 
previously considered necessary to sustain them (Jackson, 2010). In the case of  feminism, 
methodological debates have opened up a range of  options for techniques and philosophical 
assumptions that might be considered appropriate elements of  academic feminist practice 
(Caprioli, 2004; Ackerly and True, 2006). Moreover, to speak of  patriarchy, misogyny and 
sexism as processes shaping wartime sexual violence is to engage in 'common-sensical' causal 
description  (see  Kurki,  2008:139).  Indeed,  when  viewed  in  light  of  more  expansive 
defnitions  of  explanation,  feminism “depends on making  some causal  claims about  the 
nature of  patriarchal societies and global structures” (Kurki, 2008:142). 
It is against this background that different forms of  explanation can be understood as modes. 
Like other ways  of  talking  about  the world  (perspectives,  paradigms,  ideal  types,  logics, 
discourses or conducts of  inquiry), modes frame and name causal or constitutive relations 
and  mark  them as  involving  a  pattern  of  process  or  outcome,  a  way  of  distinguishing 
explanations which gives rise to claims about the underlying reasons for behaviours, events 
and social phenomena. If  explanation is one purpose and sub-set of  the larger enterprise 
called  'theory',  modes  are  packages  of  explanations  united  by  common  themes  and 
assumptions, differentiated from other modes by the distinctive way in which they assemble 
and cohere accounts of  the social world. In this sense modes are close to  styles of  reasoning: 
“the grammar of  assumptions and concepts that informs a particular approach to the social 
world: a way of  formulating problems, addressing them, and then evaluating the answers 
that have been produced” (Glynos and Howarth, 2007:8).vii 
This way of  understanding explanatory modes does not necessitate the kinds of  ontological 
foundations commonly taken as positivist,  rationalist  or realist  in orientation. By moving 
away from inquiry emulating a certain conception of  natural science and the methods of  
verifcation  or  falsifcation,  modes  of  critical  explanation  can  accommodate  relational 
understandings of  social life and explore patterns based on an understanding of  'the social'  
as made up of  the self-interpretations and understandings of  subjects (Glynos and Howarth,  
2007:49-82, 140; cf. Winch, 2008).
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A feminist  mode of  critical  explanation is thus a particular way of  understanding social  
phenomena that depends on conditions that are distinctly feminist in character. Following 
the  discussion above,  these  conditions  can be specifed  in their  broadest  form as:  i)  the 
category of  gender; and ii) the connection of  an analysis of  the category of  gender with a 
normative  project  of  emancipation,  primarily  for  those  understood  as  subordinated  in 
gender  relations.  Different  feminist  modes  will  supplement  these  conditions  with  further 
layers  of  analytical,  political  and normative content.  A feminist  mode of  accounting for 
wartime sexual violence is, then, a distinct form of  feminist critical explanation applied to 
the  phenomena  of  war  rape,  transferring  or  developing  further  arguments  from  the 
perspective of  a particular grammar of  assumptions or style of  reasoning. The claim that 
there are multiple feminist modes in the study of  wartime sexual violence attempts to show 
how these forms of  critical explanation are differentiated from each other and how their 
respective assumptions give rise to particular kinds of  stories about rape in war.
These modes are  critical  explanations because in describing and explaining social relations, 
they  also  allow  for  a  political  engagement  through  their  stress  on  the  “non-necessary 
character of  social relations” (Glynos and Howarth, 2007:153). This is itself  part of  the 
politicising character of  feminist research: in none of  the literature examined below is it 
suggested that wartime sexual violence is just a permanent pattern of  behaviour unrelated to 
our attempts to conceive of  and abolish it. In this sense, feminism can be read as critical 
theory, centrally concerned with both refexivity and normative categories, but not absent 
'cognitive content'  (meaningful knowledge) because of  that (see Geuss, 1981). So feminist 
analysis advances both an account of  current conditions and a critique of  them.viii 
This dual character of  feminism as critical explanation inevitably involves a doubled way of 
speaking.  Wartime sexual  violence is  a practice,  but  so is  accounting for wartime sexual  
violence.  Different  epistemological  traditions  demand  different  standards  of  ft  between 
these two kinds of  activity, but all approaches which seek to clarify, explicate, understand, 
explain or diagnose wartime sexual violence will deploy implicit or explicit criteria for what 
makes a set of  claims persuasive. Modes are ways of  assembling the social world in theory, of 
sorting through the mess of  evidence and experience by foregrounding certain realities while 
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ignoring  or  suppressing  others  (cf.  Glynos  and  Howarth,  2007:133-137,  cf:  Law,  2004; 
Hacking,  2002:1-26;  99-114). Identifying  and naming modes  is  thus an interpretive  and 
ideal-typifying act. Modes are arrived at by extrapolating from themes and patterns found in 
our articulations of  research and our analytical claims. 
Feminist modes of  critical explanation explicitly address such issues as the harm done by 
wartime sexual  violence; the importance of  recognising it  as  a political  phenomena; the 
gendered tropes and justifcations that exist around rape in context; the empirical evidence 
for certain forms of  brutality and wrongdoing (rape camps, mutilation, specifc groups of 
perpetrators and victims and/or a lack of  intervention by given agencies); the depiction of  
rape  in  the  media;  and  the  need  for  collaboration  to  end  rape.  But  they  usually  only 
implicitly  address  questions  around  the  appropriate  grounds  for  certain  kinds  of 
explanation; the possible debates and disputes over ideas of  agency or cause; the relation of  
feminist explanations to explanations in social theory more broadly; and the impact of  these 
issues on interventions designed to prevent or end sexual violence. These are the questions  
opened up by an investigation of  particular modes and the ways in which they do theoretical  
work.
Three Elements for Modes of  Critical Explanation
While modes are ways of  generating explanations for social  phenomena,  this  still  leaves 
many different ways in which we could give an account of  particular events through them. 
For example, we may re-describe the Waltzian typology of  causes of  war (Waltz, 2001) in 
terms of  modes: a human nature mode (frst image), a domestic order mode (second image), 
and an international anarchy mode (third image).ix While these distinctions will certainly aid 
a general sorting of  theories, they cannot tell us what the substantive content of  any particular 
theory is. Two scholars might agree that domestic order is the cause of  war but disagree on a 
range  of  specifcs:  whether  the  important  factors  are  economic  or  political,  whether 
'domestic  order'  primarily  means  state  elites,  multiple  interest  groups  or  the public  will;  
whether  the  appropriate  response  is  wholesale  national  reform  or  a  sense  of  tragic 
inevitability, and so on.
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Modes are not mere collections of  formal hypotheses, but instead combine different forms of 
intellectual practice. To understand individual examples of  modes thus demands a more 
fne-grained account, setting out the conceptual  elements which are assembled together and 
which  secure  the  coherence  of  a  mode.  These  are  the  micro-foundations  for  modes  of 
critical  explanation:  their  a)  analytical  wagers;  b)  narrative  scripts;  and  c)  normative 
orientations.
Analytical wagers are those commitments within modes to certain claims or assumptions. They 
may be explicit or implicit and are the basic axioms at the core of  the modes. They are 
organising concepts and frame the possibilities  for  theorising.  To take the most  relevant 
example,  gender  is  an analytical  wager  of  this  kind,  as  are  such common predicates  as 
rationality,  desire and identity.  Feminist  scholarship in its  broadest sense is  based on the 
wager of  gender, and could not function in the absence of  it as a category (although of  
course feminism is more than the claim that gender matters). The analytical wager of  gender 
may be specifed many different ways, but its inclusion in our conceptual and explanatory 
vocabulary generates certain forms of  explanation (e.g. Cockburn, 2010). Wagers combine 
and relate in ways which select objects of  inquiry and connect them to a line of  explanation:  
“Wagers constitute worlds, in that they quite literally set the stage for the kinds of  empirical 
and theoretical puzzles and challenges that a scholar takes to be meaningful and important” 
(Jackson, 2010:34).
Narrative  scripts are  both  the  set  of  scholarly  commitments  enacted  in  the  process  of 
elaborating a mode (as in the idea of  oneself  as 'doing' anthropology) and, more importantly 
for this analysis, the stories told about objects of  inquiry (as in the idea that someone chooses 
to rape to advance progress  towards a particular  aim).  They convert  wagers into a plot 
located in space and time, peopled by a determinate cast of  actors. Where analytical wagers  
provide the key parameters of  an explanation, narrative scripts set them to a story and a 
process which becomes sensible to us. So if  gender frames an explanation, and if  'military' 
designates a crucial component of  the social, then narrative scripts will provide stories about  
how and why people join and stay loyal to the military, and how that lived experience leads  
to the actions which a particular account is interested in. This most literal dimension of  
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social science as a kind of  story-telling draws on imagination, empathy and chronology to 
fesh out the abstractions of  wagers in a communicable human drama.
Normative  orientations  are  the  ideas  of  responsibility,  blame  and  possible  political  action 
implicated in the wagers and scripts that characterise a particular mode. Where wagers and 
scripts construct agents as motivated by ends or moved by imperatives, orientations add the 
quality  of  judgement,  often  by  seeking  explanation  in  terms  of  right  and just  conduct 
(Suganami, 2011). They might indicate which institutions or practices we may appeal to as 
solutions to wartime sexual violence, or they might challenge whether we can even apply  
such normative categories to a social situation of  such complexity at all. As the normative 
content  of  modes,  orientations  are  particularly important  to  the  political  aspects  of 
theorising  and  are  directed  towards  imperatives  of  action,  whether  in  terms  of 
consciousness-raising, global campaigns, state action or military and cultural reform. In the 
case of  an individual involved in the military as a site for the operation of  gender, normative 
orientations  will  render  judgement,  for  example  by  attributing  blame  not  to  individual 
soldiers  but  to  an  institution  or  society  guilty  of  inculcating  gendered  norms  in  those 
individuals.
The separation of  these elements, like the separation of  modes, is ideal-typical. They are 
conceptually distinct in that claims for one element do not automatically or deterministically 
trigger parallel claims in others. But elements are closely connected in that modes require a  
coherence between wagers, scripts and orientations, either in setting out their claims or in 
responding to challenges. 
Different  elements  are  related  by  ontological  politics,  which  are  the  kinds  of  politics  
generated by the deep structure of  analytical wagers, the under-determined but pervasive ways in 
which constructing a particular  kind of  subject  through analysis  also implicates  political 
claims and judgements (Law and Urry, 2004; Kurki, 2009). Political infections  emerge from 
wagers but also exist at a more fundamental level by identifying objects of  analysis. This 
connection between elements gives  rise to what has been called 'scientifc  ontology':  the 
“catalog of  objects, processes, and factors that a given line of  scientifc research expects to  
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exist  or  has  evidence  of  the  existence  of:  ontology  as  bestiary,  so  to  speak”  (Jackson, 
2010:28). For example, taking the military to be a bounded site for the operation of  gender  
sets it as an actor in explanations in a way that will shape political commitments, not least in 
making the reform or abolition of  the military a key question for feminists.
We can, and frequently do, contest some elements by reference to others. For example, we 
might say that a particular set of  assumptions about agents in IR leads to an overly narrow 
focus on individuals as evil (Ainley, 2008). This is a way of  saying that an analytical wager  
(individualism) has given rise to a focus on isolated actors (the ontological bestiary) and thus 
to a narrative script (atrocities are committed at the behest of  individuals) which bequeaths 
us  an  impoverished  normative  orientation  and  restricted  view  of  politically-meaningful 
subjects (combating atrocity means prosecuting evil individuals in international tribunals).  
An alternate  set  of  wagers  and scripts  will  lead us  to challenge international  law as  an 
adequate  forum  for  prevention  and  deterrence  and  draw  our  attention  back  to  the 
underlying claims implicated by given modes of  explanation.
Modes constrain the range of  ways in which we might 'fll  in'  the elements, but do not  
determine  them.  More  than  one  mode  may  see  international  legal  institutions  as  the 
appropriate ethical-political space for challenging wartime sexual violence. More than one 
mode  may  make  claims  across  elements  based  on  an  understanding  of  action  as 
individualistic. Taking gender as an analytical wager and the military as a site of  its power 
does not require that a particular story about soldiers be told, only that there is a space, even a 
pressure, set by the analytical wagers for some story about how the category of  gender in the 
military  is  experienced  over  time.  A different  narrative  gap  would  exist  if  our  account 
focused on a culture or civilization instead of  an institution. We would then have to tell  
stories  about  particular  peoples  and  societies,  rather  than  about  particular  people  in 
particular organisational contexts.
Elements  cohere  together  as  composite  forms  to  provide  the  substance  of  a  critical 
explanation. Conceptualising how we study wartime sexual violence (or other phenomena) 
in this way better refects the processes involved than a neat division of  different feminist  
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epistemologies or ontologies.  Again, this  is not to say that epistemology and ontology as 
usually understood are irrelevant. The analysis of  modes cannot but become embroiled in 
established debates around the character of  knowledge and the ways in which claims can or 
should be justifed. But we can discover something important about the modes taken by 
feminist  accounts  of  war rape by looking at them through the lens of  modes and their 
elements, and we may be better able to understand their contributions and lacunae by doing 
so.
The Cunning of  Reasons: Instrumentality, Unreason, and Mythology
Existing  accounts  of  rape  as  a  weapon of  war  have  privileged instrumentality,  unreason  or 
mythology as modes of  wartime sexual violence. Each mode carries its own analytical style in 
its  elements,  articulated  through  a  focus  on  particular  empirical  regularities  and  a 
corresponding characterisation of  instances of  sexual violence. All have a plausibility when 
dealing with particular examples. However, the shifting nature of  both the modes and of  the 
phenomena under analysis resists any easy preference for one mode over others or reduction 
of  them to three separate and wholly incommensurate hypotheses of  sexual violence. The 
modes are coherent but not in the sense of  being directly competing paradigms. They are 
partly overlapping, and ambiguous at the margins, but also apparently contradictory on a 
range of  key analytical problems.
Where  instrumentality  trades  in  incentives,  interests,  dispossession  and  accumulation, 
unreason speaks of  desire, bonding, esteem and sexuality and mythology conjures symbols, 
imaginaries and collective identities. These are not only different registers, but also differing 
ways of  conceiving of  power and the channels through which it  manifests  in the social, 
whether  as  political  economy,  libidinal  economy  or  symbolic  economy.  Crudely  put, 
patriarchy is made solid for instrumentality through the material benefts accrued to men by 
the subordination of  women; for unreason through the persistence of  a gender aggression 
either closely approximating sexual difference or unconsciously repeated in the processes of 
psychic cohesion; and for mythology through the perpetuation in cultural and social systems 
of  norms and rituals of  behaviour. The victims of  rape thus appear as instrumentalised 
objects (used and discarded in the pursuit of  other ends); the abject bodies of  unreason (defled 
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as sources of  deep and disgust for rapists) or mythologised subjects (others with an imagined 
group identity antagonistically opposed to that of  the perpetrators).
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Instrumentality
Instrumentality signifes self-conscious means-ends reasoning at its purest. Put directly, rape 
is cheaper than bullets.x Such an approach is certainly feminist in the sense suggested above, 
namely in its uncovering of  forms of  violence previously excluded from the subject proper of 
international politics. Yet in many ways, it replicates the stress in much mainstream IR on 
rational  individuals  as  maximising  calculators.  It  recalls,  within  a  gendered  register,  the 
'Machiavelli Theorem' of  one economist – that “no one will ever pass up an opportunity to 
gain  a  one-sided  advantage  by  exploiting  another  party”  (Hirshleifer,  1994:3).  Its 
fundamental analytical wager is that of  means-ends rationality, although this is frequently 
combined with an economic materialism and individualism. This is rationality as more than 
the idea that humans are conscious and respond to their environment in deliberative form. 
Instead, it places rationality as the mechanism of  pursuing self-interested aims at the heart of 
explanation.xi Instrumentalist  accounts  converge  on  themes  of  scarcity,  greed  and 
accumulation, and so tend to summon groups coordinated to attain the attendant benefts, 
for  example in the idea of  military battalions carrying out sexual  violence as  part  of  a 
strategy to seize valuable minerals. Its narrative scripts are of  calculating soldier-strategists 
who  self-consciously  choose to  rape,  and  its  normative  orientation  envisions  agents 
unconstrained by ethical boundaries, and thus susceptible only to direct disincentives. For 
instrumentality, rape is a weapon of  war because it is in the direct interests of  perpetrators to 
use it for other ends. So wartime sexual violence becomes an extension of  politics in the 
sense that it is one tool among many adopted by self-interested actors.
The view of  sexual violence as instrument is strongest in accounts which foreground the 
material  benefts of  war rape. Given reigning ideas of  rape as  a private  sexual  act  it  is 
perhaps not surprising that much feminist research has stressed how it facilitates material  
appropriation through terror. Doing so establishes the analytical and political connections 
between violent sexual politics and the processes of  military strategy, economic interest and 
political domination more conventionally placed within the feld of  high politics. A great 
deal  of  feminist  work has  taken an instrumentalist  approach in the sense of  identifying 
sexual  violence  as  central,  rather  than  tangential,  in  the  practice  of  war,  as  having  a 
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functional or intentional component (see Buss, 2009:148-149; Tickner, 1997:626). Rape thus 
defned is a rational technique and a calculated tool: “Torturers are trained – in military 
doctrine, chain of  command, social psychology, and anatomies” (Enloe, 2000:129). 
Empirical  support  for  the material  benefts  thesis  is  drawn from the kinds of  plans that 
embody a certain idea of  masculine ruthlessness. In Liberia, reports of  mass rape appear to 
have  been  suffcient  to  instil  fear  throughout  local  populations.  Rape  may  even  be  a 
'shrewder military tactic' than others since it is hard to prove and seldom prosecuted in war 
crimes  tribunals  (Cain,  1999:284;  Sharlach,  2000:90).  Military  documents  from Bosnia-
Herzegovina appear to show a conscious military calculation of  means and ends, stating for 
example that “[Muslim] morale, desire for battle, and will could be crushed more easily by 
raping women, especially minors and even children” (quoted in Salzman, 1998:35; see also 
Kaldor, 2007:58-59). Certainly, the cheapness of  wartime sexual violence for an economic 
strategy of  resource accumulation in the DRC is central for campaigners like Eve Ensler, 
who has commented that “rape is a very cheap method of  warfare. You don't have to buy 
scud missiles or hand grenades” (National Public Radio, 2009; see also Ensler, 2009). The 
importance of  military objectives and economic goods in the narrative scripts of  why men 
rape brings these claims close to ideas of  'greed' as the fuel for civil war, with sexual violence  
the weapon of  choice in the struggle for diamonds or coltan (see Collier,  2000; Cramer 
2002; Berdal, 2005).xii
Rape is a weapon of  war in an instrumentalist mode because it is the most effective tool for  
the aims pursued. Accordingly,  instrumentalism can accommodate a number of  possible 
ends which rape serves (Card, 1996). What it maintains is the idea of  a conscious and goal-
directed tactic (a short-term policy related to a particular circumstance) or strategy (a more 
sustained mode of  fghting directed towards  a  more  fnal  goal).  In practice,  this  almost 
always means an economic end. This may amount to a claim that individual soldiers rape 
for money and so ft the kind of  model common in rational choice economics, with 'private 
goods' extracted by individual agents with a regularity “robust to the passage of  time and to 
cultural  and  ideological  variance”  (Butler,  Gluch  and  Mitchell,  2007:671).  But 
instrumentality is also conducive to thinking in terms of  the class basis of  sexual violence, 
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with  men acting in more  collective  economic  interests  to  extract  wealth  or  to  maintain 
unequal  economic  relationships  over  particular  groups  of  women  understood  as  a 
productive resource (see Hartsock, 2004). Rape thus becomes a weapon for the maintenance 
of  a particular kind of  material power, with other dimensions being secondary, if  visible at 
all.
Talking about rape in instrumentalist terms has certain limiting effects for the interpretation 
of  what it means for sexual violence to be a tool of  organised violence (Buss, 2009:160). It 
establishes certain understandings of  how social action is carried out, of  who the relevant 
sides are in a situation of  war and/or genocide, and who gets to count as an audible or 
legible witness.  For example, structuring explanation around the aim to acquire material 
benefts would seem to involve an idea of  exteriority in that it is particular situations which 
create incentives, which in turn shape behaviour. An interior space remains, but this scripts  
the subject as a calculator, a mechanism for interpreting the data of  the world, rather than 
the  source  of  affective  charge.  The  accompanying  materialism  posits  actors  driven  by 
imperatives  of  accumulation  and  so  invokes  a  normative  orientation  towards  males  as 
primarily  or  overwhelmingly  rational  beings  who may respond more  readily  to  military 
force,  the  threat  of  prosecution or  institutional  constraints  than to  education about  the 
experience of  rape and its long-term effects on survivors.
Unreason
Unreason signifes that which lies outside the realm of  the self-conscious sovereign 
individual and his coherently-plotted, goal-directed action. It can imply irrationality in the 
sense of  actions that do not beneft, or even harm, an actor, but it is not chaotic or random. 
Instead, it suggests the dimensions of  behaviour that escape self-refection and which defy 
incentives. Sexual violence in these accounts takes the form of  a drive or a bond, biological 
or social psychological. Unreason's analytical wagers are those of  emotional and expressive 
being and of  variegated and contested internal mental states. This gives rise to a focus on 
themes of  trauma, affect and the (perhaps collective) unconscious. The relevant actors thus 
become not so much institutions or  organisations as  individuals  led to certain acts  by a 
confuence of  events and internal urges. Its narrative scripts revolve around a psyche opaque 
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to itself. Consequently war rapists often appear to unreason as confused, frustrated or angry.  
Unreason’s  normative  orientation  addresses  the  conditions  that  perpetuate  such 
psychological states. At the limit, this implies that rape cannot be changed by policy but must 
be accepted as a kind of  persistent eruption. This can include essentialist  views of  male 
desire which come close to some non-feminist explanations for rape, although most accounts 
from unreason establish a more subtle interpretation of  psychology and its link to biology. 
For unreason, rape is a weapon of  war because it is the result of  desire and fear faced by 
perpetrators in brutalising situations of  affect and trauma. Wartime sexual violence is here  
politicised in the sense of  combating a divide between apparently ‘private’ desires (such as 
lust) and ‘public’ events (the systematic destruction wrought by war) and in seeing emotions  
as causes and consequences of  political processes.
Unreason is purest in work which stresses the expressive role of  sexual violence. This is rape 
as an over-fowing of  frustration. Among its motifs is the idea of  sexual abuse as an act of 
group cohesion among men (Bourgois, 2003; Goldstein, 2001:365-366). It notes the frequent 
presence of  alcohol in rape as well as racist abuse, all “typically conducted in a hands-on 
orgy  of  bloodletting”  (Boose,  2002:74,  see  also  Ehrenreich,  1997:11-12).  Related 
justifcations based on the logic of  inevitable expressive unreason ('this is just what soldiers 
do') have been critiqued by Susan Brownmiller but have also been implicated in her much-
quoted view that rape is  “one of  the satisfactions of  conquest,  like  a boot in the face” 
(Brownmiller, 1994:181). The most brutal and shocking acts associated with wartime sexual 
violence –  the severing  of  body parts,  mutilation and 'extra  insults'  in  addition to  rape 
(Bjørnlund, 2008:18-26; Bourke, 1999:188-190; Sharlach, 2000:95) – seem to ft with the 
mode  of  unreason,  especially  where  they  are  accompanied  by  evidence  of  pleasurable 
release for perpetrators. Practices of  sexual deflement suggest a deep disgust and horror 
motivating rapists  (Diken and Laustsen, 2005), details which evoke rape as carnivalesque 
'laboratories in total  domination'  (Bjørnlund, 2009:24). Unreason assembles  narratives of 
celebratory  and transgressive  violence,  psychopathology,  perverse  homo-sociality  and the 
kind of  criminal opportunism that can fnd no justifcation in a fnancial reward.
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Unreason also resonates particularly with common views of  rape in 'peacetime' contexts. 
Although there is an overlap with mythological explanations in the sense that such behaviour 
is supported by cultural beliefs and rape myths (Bourke, 2007:21-88), unreason promotes a 
narrative  script  of  the  rapist  as  a  certain  type  of  individual,  one  empowered  to  sexual 
violence by elements of  their personality, including entitlement, violence, control and anger 
(Rozée and Koss, 2001:299-301). The sexed body and its affective states are centre-stage, as 
are  the  emotional  transitions  which  escape  the  calculating  logic  of  instrumentality,  for 
example  in  diagnosing  violence  as  the  result  of  grief  mobilised  as  rage  (Ehrenreich, 
1997:139).  Although  the  mode  of  unreason  need  not  imply  any  trans-historical  sexual 
essence, it does invoke a particular view of  rape as related to sex and sexuality, as in the 
claim that “[r]apists possess a subconscious knowledge about human vulnerability acquired 
through the centrality of  our sexuality to our personhood” (du Toit, 2009:298).
This aggression and sadism may be a directed heterosexuality (lust as an effcient cause of 
rape) or a more amorphous homosociality (the production of  masculine sexuality through 
processes  of  male  bonding).  Both are implicated in Catharine MacKinnon's  well-known 
argument that the saturation of  Yugoslavia with pornography before the outbreak of  war 
meant that “a whole population of  men [was] primed to dehumanize women and to enjoy 
inficting  assault  sexually”  (MacKinnon,  1994:77).  This  is  a  script  of  almost  automated 
mimesis,  in  which  watching  pornography  produces  rapists  through  a  psychic  infection, 
passed on celluloid and video tape (see also MacKinnon, 1989; Schauer, 1987:764-767).
In the case of  unreason, sexual violence can be a tool, and a weapon in and of  war, without it 
serving instrumentalist ends: 
“When a victorious army rapes, the sheer intoxication of  the triumph is only part of  the 
act.  After the fact, the rape may be viewed as part of  a recognizable pattern of  
national terror and subjugation. I say 'after the fact' because the original impulse to rape 
does not need a sophisticated political motivation beyond a general disregard for the 
bodily integrity of  women” (Brownmiller, 1975:37, emphasis added). 
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So  sexual  violence  remains  political,  collective  and  fundamentally  linked  to  war  as  a 
practice, but the apparently instrumental benefts are now rendered not as causes, but as 
consequences and afterthoughts. Rape is still about power, but now in a sense which includes 
the dimension of  sexuality and its attendant taboos in a much clearer way.
In contrast to the exteriority of  instrumentality, unreason relies on a fractured interiority. 
Unreason contains  both the joys of  war  (war as  game,  war as  psychopathy and war as  
festival) and behaviour in war as trauma or psychological coercion (drugs as an enforced 
lubricant to sexual violence, the kidnapping and brutalisation of  children and the fearful 
lashing out of  men with guns). Consequently, its normative orientation becomes similarly 
fractured between an outright condemnation and palpable disgust at the pleasure taken by 
protagonists in sexual violence on the one hand, and a pitying recognition of  trauma on the 
other, directing us to move away from a model in which the actors themselves feature so 
prominently to one which asks questions about how any human being could become so 
damaged as to enact these fantasies on the bodies of  others in the frst place.
Mythology
In  some  senses,  mythology  is  a  mediating  term  between  instrumentality  and 
unreason,  curtailing  proft  maximisation  within  socio-cultural  bounds  and  providing  a 
symbolic framework for drives. But it is also much wider, embracing discourses, collective 
belief  systems and ideologies. It includes not only doctrines and religion, but the background 
assumptions that are constructed through human communities, even of  “rape as an identity-
producing practice” (Hansen, 2001:60). This is the view of  sexual violence as shaped by 
cultural  idioms,  embodied in a  habitus of  masculinity or  the expression of  long-standing 
schemas of  the body and of  gender (Bourdieu, 2001; Taylor, 1999). Mythology's analytical 
wagers  are  those  of  collective  identity  and  the  primacy  of  human  communities.  
Thematically it concentrates on socially meaningful difference and subjectivities grounded in 
the imperatives and limits of  a community or a particular institution, which then become 
the relevant objects and actors. Narrative scripts here frame rapists not as self-interested or 
as acting out personal desires, but as performers of  socio-cultural ritual. Ethical and political  
options are thus shaped to suggest solutions in terms of  changes made to the communities or 
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institutions  in  question,  for  example  through  political  campaigns  contesting  collective 
misogynistic beliefs or transformations in the forms of  recruitment and training undergone 
by soldiers. For mythology, rape is a weapon of  war because it is selected as appropriate  
behaviour by a social  group which sets  the self-understandings of  perpetrators.  Wartime 
sexual violence is a continuation of  political power in a more dispersed and collective sense,  
designating  some as  legitimate  and others  as  illegitimate  depending  on their  circulation 
within the rules and norms of  the group. Rape is an extension and manifestation of  the 
political unconscious. 
Mythology embodies that feminist concern well articulated by Simone de Beauvoir when 
she argued that the 'othering'  of  women was not only about  economic interest  but also 
'ontological and moral pretensions':  “Once the subject seeks to assert himself,  the Other, 
who limits  and denies  him, is  none the less  a  necessity  to  him:  he attains  himself  only 
through the reality which he is not, which is something other than himself ” (de Beauvoir,  
1997:171). For Andrea Dworkin, the word 'mythology' itself  was central to any dissection of 
patriarchy: “We are programmed by the culture as surely as rats are programmed to make the 
arduous way through the scientist's maze, and that programming operates at every level of 
choice and action” (Dworkin, 1974:155, emphasis in original).
The view of  wartime sexual violence as a symbolic refection of  masculinist mythology is 
strongest  in  those  accounts  that  stress  the  ways  in  which  women  are  treated  as  signs 
exchanged among men. Just as there is a persistent patriarchal view of  women as 'beautiful 
souls', sexualised aggression can be related not so much to the particular material rewards of 
the act  as  to  the imaginary role of  certain  women as  representatives  of  a nation to be  
destroyed or a community to be punished, and of  rape as a violation that only counts as a 
violation  in  some  collective  sense  because  of  patriarchal  norms  of  family  and  custom 
(MacKenzie,  2010;  Elshtain,  1995;  Anand,  2008;  Žarkov,  2007).  Ruth  Seifert,  for  one, 
accepts institutional explanations of  sexual violence but also introduces culture both as that 
which rape aims at destroying and as the 'background' to rape orgies, a set of  ideas which 
generate their content. On this account, women may be raped “because they are the objects  
of  a fundamental hatred that characterizes the cultural  unconscious and is actualized in 
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times of  crisis” (Seifert, 1994:57-66, 55), bodies on which a particular intersubjectivity acts  
itself  out in carnivalesque form.
Just as women can function as symbols within a war system, so too can sexual violence serve 
to reproduce systems of  patriarchy. As a way of  acting that refects the socially symbolic 
place of  women, rape's fundamental function in this trend of  explanation is perpetuate a 
system of  collective being beyond the bounds of  mere interest or desire.  The mythological 
mode is, then, distinguished from a material benefts explanation by the role of  ideology,  
which suggests  that individuals and communities are targeted not for their resources but 
because of  their identities, even if  such attacks can result in political or material advantage for 
perpetrators. A  similarly  strong  way  of  thinking  about  wartime  sexual  violence  in 
mythological terms links it explicitly to culture, where brutalisation mirrors culturally specifc 
tropes, such as impalement and crucifxion in Bosnia or the systematic cutting of  tendons 
and violation of  bodily 'fows' in Rwanda (Boose, 2002:75-89; Taylor, 1999).
Mythology need not condemn whole cultures in a way that buttresses retrograde ideas of  
patriarchal others or inherently misogynistic civilizational constellations. It may just as well 
refer to specifc institutional  contexts and the particular practices hegemonic there (as in 
Cohn,  1987).  For  example,  in  the  mid-1990s  Madeline  Morris  examined  the  ‘rape 
differential’  (the  gap  between  civilian  and  military  crime  rates)  between  the  actions  of 
American soldiers in times of  peace and in times of  war. While she found that rates of  
military violent crimes were lower than civilian ones in peacetime, the propensity of  soldiers  
to rape in wartime leapt to 260% of  the civilian rate (the comparative rate of  other crimes 
remained lower than that of  civilians) (Morris, 1996:666). Morris rejected the idea that all-
male groups were automatically implicated in higher rape rates  and further argued that  
higher  rape  rates  in  wartime  conferred  no  strategic  beneft  in  military  terms  (Morris,  
1996:678, 762), preferring instead to see the higher levels of  rape as a consequence of  the 
particular  masculinist  practices  characteristic  of  the  US  military.  In  other  words,  she 
decoded military rape as the product not of  instrumentality or unreason, but of  mythology.  
The institutional culture, not resource pressures or suppressed lust, inculcated a set of  beliefs 
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that led to heightened levels of  wartime sexual violence (see also particularly Eriksson Baaz 
and Stern, 2009).
In the mode of  mythology, rape is again a weapon and a tool, but not one that belongs to  
individuals or which is used for accumulation or to release sexual frustration. Instead, it is a  
tool  for  a  particular  community.  It  obeys  the  internal  requirements  and  limits  set  by  a 
particular socio-symbolic order. Resources matter in sustaining and reproducing a group, but 
that does not mean that all acts in war are orientated towards that end or even that violence 
should  be understood as  an accumulatory  strategy  in any setting.  Indeed,  following  the 
norms of  a group may be counter-productive in terms of  material  well-being, and may 
involve restrictions on pleasure as well as the licence to carry out particular socially-sanctioned 
acts. Rape is a tool of  power again, but now in a more variable sense, requiring attention to  
the legitimacy of  certain actors in context and to shared ideas of  appropriateness and taboo.
In identifying context-specifc belief  systems, mythology moves to an ontological politics and 
set of  analytical wagers based on the community (whether political, social or institutional) 
and the particular practices it legitimates. Consequently, explanation does not rely either on 
the external situation or the personal traumas of  rapists but on the collective and its rules.  
Mythology's narrative scripts thus focus on symbolic authority, whether in terms of  a kind of 
demand  made  on  actors  to  enact  certain  tropes  or  because  it  identifes  an  external 
community to be destroyed via the example if  its feminine embodiments. 
How Modes Matter
These differences in feminist accounts of  war rape do not directly correspond to debates 
between positivists and constructivists or between qualitative and quantitative approaches to  
data.  Nor do they  merely  map onto  feminist  empiricist,  standpoint  feminist  or  feminist  
postmodernist strands of  theory. Given that the conditions for legitimate knowledge have 
been the subject of  major debate ever since feminism’s contested entry into the discipline 
(Keohane,  1989;  Weber,  1994;  Tickner,  1997;  Hutchings  2008)  it  is  not  surprising  that 
subsequent  diagnosis  has  returned  to  these  questions.  But  the  contrasts  between 
instrumentality, unreason and mythology operate at another level. As sophisticated analyses 
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of  philosophy of  social science within IR have repeatedly stressed, a philosophical position 
on epistemology, ontology and methodology does not,  and cannot, give rise to a substantive 
theory  of  how  and  why  certain  events  occur  (Jackson,  2010:  26-28,  205-207; Joseph, 
2007:345).  If  its  distinguishing  features  are  “asking  feminist  questions  and  building 
knowledge from women's lives” (Tickner, 2005:4; see also Enloe, 1996), then feminist IR 
itself  cannot be defned by a unitary methodological perspective.
Instead, we should look to the kinds of  research questions asked, the ways in which the answers are  
variably constructed and the emancipatory political commitments built into them. There are manifest 
and latent stories about what feminist analysis does (Soreanu, 2010:383), just as there are 
manifest and latent stories about how feminism takes on and transforms categories inherited 
from  elsewhere  (Harding,  1986;  Weigman,  2002).  Further,  as  Mary  Caprioli  argues 
(2004:256-257),  there  is  a  real  risk  of  feminism being  seen  –  by  both  proponents  and 
detractors – through the Popperian 'Myth of  the Framework', where it is assumed that real 
differences  in  approaches  are  projected  'all  the  way  down',  such  that  there  can  be  no 
commonality or communication with paradigmatic others.
Claims made by different feminist modes have typically been united under the proposition 
that  rape  is  a  weapon of  war.  This  phraseology,  although  politically  potent,  covers  for 
signifcant  ambiguity  in  the  understanding  of  what  a  weapon  is  and  how  it  can  be 
deployed.xiii When considered  in  terms  of  instrumentality,  unreason  and mythology,  the 
tensions between different possible explanations are distributed in a new way. In some cases 
the modes  are  straightforwardly  contradictory  and thus force a  choice  between political 
options. For example, it has been argued both that rape happens because the militaries in 
question are extremely hierarchical  organisations in which troops obey specifc orders  to 
rape  (instrumentality)  and  that  sexual  violence  is  opportunistic,  occurring  because  the 
militaries in question are insufficiently hierarchical, leading troops to ignore orders and carry 
out  their  own  wishes  (unreason).  In  the  latter  example,  efforts  to  strengthen  and  train 
militaries in confict zones will decrease rape. In the former, such efforts will only increase 
the  effectiveness  of  the  masculinised  war  machine  (see  Leiby,  2009).xiv And viewing the 
military  as  a  site  of  mythology may require  neither  increases  nor  decreases  in  levels  of 
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hierarchy but instead point to the necessity of  shifts in institutional culture. More generally,  
military solutions might decrease sexual violence or increase it, depending on the underlying 
assumptions of  the mode in question.
A plausible instrumentalist account might also suggest that rape is only employed in war in 
so far  as  it  secures  obedience.  But  if  the reason for  this  compliance is  that  women are  
symbols among men, what grounds are there for suspecting that the intended male anguish 
of  defeat will not lead to re-doubled efforts at resistance?xv   Since observers are so often 
killed  immediately  after  the  spectacle  itself  (Engle,  2005:788),  any  strategic  'benefts'  of  
sexual violence would seem to be immediately squandered. Sexual violence may simply be 
counter-productive in instrumentalist terms, a problem that also affects the study of  extreme 
violence in general (Kalyvas, 2006:144). For example, the atrocities of  Nanking do not seem 
to have been militarily successful but instead galvanised Chinese patriotism and animated 
worldwide anti-Japanese propaganda (Goldstein, 2001:367; Brownmiller, 1975:41). 
More commonly, different modes of  critical explanation will not crystallise as distinct policy 
options. Rather, understanding sexual violence in terms of  one or other form of  critical 
explanation will  shape the priorities  and forms of  political  intervention adopted. This is  
Engle’s point when she criticises some feminist activism for contributing to an understanding 
of  war rape in terms of  ethnicity  and sex in a way which diverts  attention from wider 
patterns of  gender oppression (Engle, 2005: 814-815). In similar terms, Carol Harrington 
(2010) traces the adoption of  an ‘abolitionist’ strategy for politicising sexual violence to the 
consolidation of  a technocratic and trauma-based model of  humanitarian intervention. In 
both cases, forms of  feminist argument that closely parallel modes of  critical explanation as 
set out here mattered both in their infuence over concrete forms of  anti-rape politics and in 
the  framing  of  realistic  future  options.  For  Engle,  it  was  an  uncritical  adoption  of 
mythological explanations (war rape as ethnically-motivated group ideology) which allowed 
a narrow portrayal of  Serbian male identity as the problem. For Harrington, an individualist  
form of  unreason (women as isolated sufferers of  trauma) separates out victims of  rape from 
wider patterns of  gender inequality and so paradoxically weakens anti-rape politics.
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Although  distinct,  instrumentality,  unreason  and  mythology  are  not  straight-forwardly 
incompatible.  Modes meet at borders of  common interest:  instrumentality and unreason 
share an interest in questions of  desire, (ir)rationality, interiority and control;  unreason and 
mythology both require an analysis of  the psycho-social divide and the complex relations of  
subjectivity  and  inter-subjectivity;  and  mythology  and  instrumentality  recognise  the 
functional and collective aspects of  violence. This is at least partly a consequence of  the kind 
of  'rational reconstruction' necessary to set out the three modes as doing unacknowledged 
work in feminist explanations (see Jackson, 2010:38-39). Moving between the ideal-types of 
the modes and the specifc, detailed accounts of  how particular feminists have constructed 
their  work  highlights  those  areas  in  which  elements  bind  together  and  those  in  which 
overlaps are more complicated. 
But the resultant ambiguity is not simply that of  an intellectual menu from which aspects 
can be chosen at whim, since the kinds of  amalgamated modes of  critical explanation that 
result differ in politically and analytically consequential ways. The overlapping yet coherent 
character of  modes means that specifc examples of  rape in war can be made amenable to  
more  than one mode of  critical  explanation.  This  poses  a  problem common to theory, 
scientifc or otherwise, of  how to determine which pattern of  reasoning provides the most 
plausible  account  of  sexualised  aggression  in  confict.  This  is  the  problem  of  the  gap 
between modes of  inquiry and modes of  action, between discourses of  explanation and the 
behaviours  to  which  they  refer,  however  closely  they  may  be  linked  in  the  process  of 
interpretation.  Evaluating feminist  accounts  of  wartime sexual  violence will  thus  require 
further stages of  contention and articulation. But this is no more challenging in the case of  
rape than it is when we discuss the character of  the nation-state or the role of  democracy in  
global politics. As in other subfelds of  IR, determining how things happen and why evades  
any easy resolution. 
Accepting this analysis nevertheless leaves some questions unanswered. First, there is much 
more to be said about the potential for revisiting and revising existent accounts of  wartime 
sexual violence. We are only now beginning to think seriously about the large variation in 
the extent and character of  rape in war (Wood, 2008). Perhaps the differences in modes 
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arises  as  a particular  consequence of  the case-by-case  approach,  with those working on 
Bosnia or Darfur stressing military commands and strategy, while students of  the Rwandan 
genocide are more alive to mythological aspects and accounts of  wartime sexual violence 
quicker to identify the frustration and pleasures taken by individual men as the running 
theme. If  so, this may lead us to abandon any hope of  a general account of  wartime sexual 
violence in favour of  more specifc, historically-located claims, or it might encourage us to 
trace connective elements across space and time.
Second, attention to the analytical-political character of  feminist analysis suggests further 
exploration of  how this tension works in practice. Since this is a constitutive tension, this  
does not mean abolishing it,  but better  understanding how the different elements of  an 
approach are linked and the impact they have on each other. In some cases, this may be 
grounds for revisiting assumptions and re-evaluating them. Can we afford an appeal to law 
enforcement as disincentive if  analysis locates the causes of  war rape elsewhere? And how 
might  the  political  positions  involved  in  feminism  provide  a  standpoint  for  the 
reconceptualisation of  analytical options?
Conclusions
If  agreement that rape is a weapon of  war can nevertheless entail radically different ideas of 
why wartime violence happens, what forms it takes, and what can be done about it, then 
understanding the character of  those different ideas becomes important. Feminist accounts  
instantiate modes of  critical explanation: modes because their grammars and styles have a 
structure  and  coherence;  explanation because  this  coherence  is  not  merely  political  or 
descriptive, but provides an analytical account of  why certain behaviours occur and how 
they lead to certain events  and not  others;  and  critical explanation because  they  do not 
assume that the processes identifed are deterministic and instead see them as social relations  
and products amenable, or at least partly open, to critique and change.
Theory,  especially  feminist  and  critical  theory,  has  a  politics as  well  as  explanatory 
dimension. Its transformative potential is closely related to the capacity to conjure a world 
through the work of  assemblage. In the case of  wartime sexual violence, feminist theory has  
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advanced  a  wide  and  convincing  range  of  understandings  of  the  character,  cause  and 
impact of  sexualised aggression, especially when viewed in contrast to non-feminist attempts 
at explanation. It has frequently done so with reference to the idea of  rape as a weapon of 
war, which has been fundamental to preserving the status of  wartime sexual  violence as 
social behaviour, as structural, persistent and functional. It is “too widespread, too frequent and 
seemingly too calculated and effective not to be part of  a larger political scheme and hence a 
weapon of  war” (Skjelsbæk, 2001:115). 
But the political has many forms and weapons can serve many purposes. This paper has 
suggested  three  such  modes  of  critical  explanation  –  instrumentality,  unreason  and 
mythology – through which thinking about wartime sexual violence has been organised. It 
has set out how the modes differ and why that matters. In doing so, it has developed an  
account both of  the tension between political and analytical critique in feminist IR and of 
the link between specifc problems faced by feminist accounts of  wartime sexual violence 
and any and all attempts to understand social behaviour. 
Thinking in terms of  feminist modes of  critical explanation consequently encourages further 
work in an unfolding research agenda. Exposing submerged disagreements thus has heuristic 
as well as explanatory value: it clarifes the ways in which scholars may talk past each other  
while  appearing  to  speak  in  common  terms.xvi Refecting  on  the  forms  taken  by  our 
arguments as scholars and activists, and the various commitments concealed within them, 
allows for a renewed examination of  direction and purpose. Sexual violence often seems, in 
its horror, to conform vividly to Primo Levi 's diagnosis of  'useless violence': “an end in itself, 
with the sole purpose of  creating pain, occasionally having a purpose, yet always redundant, 
always disproportionate to the purpose itself ” (Levi, 1989:83). There may instead be many 
purposes and ends, and many possible reasons, if  no satisfying moral resolutions, beneath 
our standard accounts of  rape as a weapon of  war.
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i  Interview with author. See International Alert, 2010.
ii The phrase is from Enloe, 2000:108.
iii See Carver, Cochran and Squires, 1998; Carpenter, 2002; Carver, Zalewski, Kinsella and Carpenter, 2003; Squires 
and Weldes, 2007; and Hutchings, 2008 for the contours of the dispute around the definition of feminist IR.
iv Terminological boundaries are porous and unstable, which means that some may interpret what follows as 
insufficiently feminist while others find it excessively so. This is in the nature of contested intellectual projects. 
v The phrase is from Wiegman, 2002:18.
vi See Law, 2004:42-50 for the distinction between coherence (the way a particular form of understanding hangs 
together as an assemblage) and consistency (a stronger requirement based on how different elements of a theory work  
together logically).
vii Although the quote is from Glynos and Howarth, 'style of reasoning' is Ian Hacking's term. Glynos and Howarth 
themselves use this background to elaborate an approach to logics of critical analysis. Modes can also be read in this  
way, but I have chosen not to call them logics at this stage to avoid misunderstandings or complex comparison with the 
ways in which 'logics' are already discussed in IR (see Müller, 2004; Pouliot, 2008; and Hopf, 2010). 
viii This is a significant and complex point, but one which I do not explore here due to constraints of space. The 
question of how tensions between feminism as an academic or knowledge practice and as a political project have been  
extensively rehearsed. See, for example, Brown, 2005 and Wiegman, 2002.
ix I am indebted to George Lawson for suggesting this analogy.
x The phrase is from Sydney Morning Herald, 2009 but has also been used by Amnesty International in their campaigns 
against rape as a weapon of war.
xi Other modes can be seen as attributing a kind of 'rationality' (for example, in the potential usefulness for commanders  
of expressive group bonding), but this comes closer to functionalist explanation than instrumentalism. Again, what 
distinguishes instrumentalism's view of rationality is its conscious, self-interested and means-ends orientation. I am 
grateful to an anonymous reviewer for emphasising this point.
xii This is an important link and one that illustrates the link between the underlying logics of feminist accounts and 
those discernable in other non-feminist works.
xiii I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pushing me to clarify this point.
xiv Of course, it is possible that both explanations are valid in different situations.
xv The phrase is from Brownmiller, 1975:38.
xvi I am grateful to George Lawson for persuading me to re-emphasise this point.
